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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(k). The Utah Supreme Court has transferred this appeal to the Utah
Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(4). The Utah Court of
Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(j).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Whether the trial court may inquire into a recommendation that a derivative

action be dismissed by examining whether the recommendation is in good faith after a
reasonable inquiry into the bases supporting the conclusions advocating dismissal.
Standard of Review. "We review the district court's denial of the motion for
dismissal pursuant to Rule 23.1 for abuse of discretion." Peller v. Southern Co., 911 F.2d
1532, 1536 (11 th Cir. 1990).
2.

Whether the trial court may evaluate the reasoning supporting a

recommendation to dismiss a derivative action pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a740(4)(a).
Standard of Review. "We review the district court's denial of the motion for
dismissal pursuant to Rule 23.1 for abuse of discretion." Peller v. Southern Co., 911 F.2d
1532, 1536 (11 th Cir. 1990).
3.

If the independent person specified under Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-

740(4)(f) determines that the Defendants acted with sound business judgment, i.e., within
the "business judgment rule"; and concludes that the Corporation should not proceed with
the derivative claims against it, can the trial Court still require the Corporation to proceed
1

with the derivative claims? Does this disregard the mandate in § 16-10a-740(4)(a) that
the court shall dismiss the derivative proceeding?
Standard of Review. "We review the district court's denial of the motion for
dismissal pursuant to Rule 23.1 for abuse of discretion." Peller v. Southern Co., 911 F.2d
1532, 1536(ll th Cir. 1990).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
The determinative statutes in this case are (1) Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-740(4)(a)
and Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-740(5)(a), which provides as follows:
§16-10a-740(4)(a) A derivative proceeding shall be dismissed by the
court on motion by the corporation if a person or group specified in
Subsections (4)(b) or (4)(f) determines in good faith after conducting a
reasonable inquiry upon which its conclusions are based that the
maintenance of the derivative proceeding is not in the best interest of the
corporation.

§16-10a-740(5)(a) A derivative proceeding may not be discontinued
or settled without the court's approval.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. The Nature of the Case. The lawsuit concerns a business opportunity
presented to Millcreek Coffee Roasters Corp., ("Roasters"). Roasters was incorporated
on or about April 5, 1996. Roasters operates a wholesale coffee imports, roasting and
retail sales business. Roasters was owned equally between D. Steven Brewster and Dana
Brewster until on or about January 1, 2006, when D. Steven Brewster and Dana Brewster
gifted shares of Roasters to their three children which left the ownership percentages as
follows: D. Steven Brewster (47%), Dana Brewster (47%), and their three children,
2

Steven, Stacey and Tiffany, who each own 2%. (R. 647, ^f 16). D. Steven Brewster and
Dana Brewster were divorced on or about December 23, 1996, although they continue as
business partners. (R. 534).
Sometime in the fall of 2005, Roasters was approached, through D. Steven
Brewster, with the opportunity to open two retail stores in the Salt Lake International
Airport with Host International (R. 98, f 11; 537, ^ 29). D. Steven Brewster determined
$200,000 would be required to fund the airport venture. (R. 1188). D. Steven Brewster
told Dana she needed to come up with $100,000 to fund half of the airport venture, and
he would fund the other $ 100,000. (R. 1190). Dana requested a business plan and
additional information on the airport venture before she would come up with the funds.
(R. 1212, Tf 3). Despite Dana's requests for information from D. Steven Brewster, she
was given very little detail and information consisting of two emails, although D. Steven
Brewster told Dana Brewster he had actual sales data from Starbucks Coffee and another
coffee chain who were both prior tenants of the Salt Lake International Airport and did
not share that data with Dana. (R. 1212-13,ffif4 & 5).
The airport venture was eventually funded with $100,000 from Roasters and the
remaining $100,000 from D. Steven Brewster individually. (R. 1191). The airport
venture has been very profitable and 75% of the money used to invest in the airport
venture was repaid to D. Steven Brewster and Roasters in the first year the airport stores
were in operation. (R. 1565, p. 29-30). As it turned out, Roasters would have had
enough money through savings and ongoing earnings when combined with the earnings
of the airport stores to fund the entire $200,000 for the airport venture instead of only half
3

of that amount. (R. 1228-30; 1565, pp. 33-34). Dana initiated this lawsuit against the
defendants mainly because D. Steven Brewster usurped a corporate opportunity by
retaining 50% of the airport venture for his own personal benefit as opposed to allowing
Roasters to own the entire 100% of the opportunity.
This Complaint in this case was filed October 31, 2006, and included the
following causes of action: (1) Judicial Dissolution of Millcreek Coffee Airport, (2)
Breach of Fiduciary Duty, (3) Aiding and Abetting Breach of Fiduciary Duty, (4)
Removal of Directors, (5) Trademark Infringement, (6) Unfair Competition, (7) Tortuous
Interference with Contractual or Business Relations, (8) Intentional Interference with
Prospective Economic Relations, (9) Declaratory Judgment, (10) Temporary and
Permanent Injunctive Relief, (11) Unjust Enrichment, and (12) Breach of Contract. (R.
1-80).
An Amended Complaint was filed April 5, 2007, that included all of the causes of
action in the first Complaint, plus Wrongful Appropriation of Corporate Opportunity.
(R. 530-625).
A Second amended complaint was filed April 9, 2009, that included the following
causes of action: (1) Breach of Fiduciary Duty, (2) Aiding and Abetting Breach of
Fiduciary Duty, (3) Trademark Infringement, (4) Unfair Competition, (5) Wrongful
Appropriation of Corporate Opportunity, (6) Tortuous Interference with Contractual or
Business Relations, (7) Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic Relations.
(R. 1397-1419).

4

Roasters eventually retained the services of R. Brad Townsend, a local C.P.A. and
forensic accountant to offer a recommendation about whether or not Roasters should
pursue the derivative action initiated by Dana Brewster or whether it should move to
dismiss the derivative complaint. Townsend issued his report on July 7, 2008.
Thereafter, Townsend issued an affidavit dated October 7, 2008, wherein he states: "It is
my recommendation from a financial and accounting perspective that that the derivative
causes of action are dismissed in the best interest of Roasters." (See R. 1026, ^ 10).
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Court below. Roasters filed a

motion to dismiss the derivative action on October 9, 2008 pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
16-10a-740(4)(a). (R. 1031). Dana Brewster opposed Roaster's motion to dismiss. A
hearing on Roaster's motion to dismiss derivative action was held on February 9, 2009.
An evidentiary hearing wherein R. Brad Townsend testified in person was held March
30, 2009.
The Honorable John Paul Kennedy thereafter entered an order that R. Brad
Townsend conducted his investigation in good faith, but denied the motion to dismiss
because of "questions concerning the reasonableness of Mr. Townsend's inquiry, as to
whether the Corporation did all it could to fund the Airport project." (R. 1505-08).
Defendant D. Steven Brewster filed a Petition for Interlocutory Appeal pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-740(4)(g) on May 5, 2009. (R. 1519).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Roasters was incorporated on or about April 5, 1996.

5

2.

Roasters operates a wholesale coffee imports, roasting, and retail store

business. Roasters was owned equally between D. Steven Brewster and Dana Brewster
until on or about January 1, 2006, when D. Steven Brewster and Dana Brewster gifted
shares of Roasters to their three children which left the ownership percentages as follows:
D. Steven Brewster (47%), Dana Brewster (47%), and their three children, Steven, Stacey
and Tiffany, who each own 2%. (R. 647, f 16).
3.

D. Steven Brewster and Dana Brewster were divorced on or about

December 23, 1996, although they continue as business partners. (R. 534).
4.

Sometime in the fall of 2005, Roasters was approached, through D. Steven

Brewster in his capacity as an officer of Roasters, with the opportunity to open two retail
stores in the Salt Lake International Airport with Host International (R. 98, ^f 11; 537, ^
29; R. 1565, p. 46).
5.

D. Steven Brewster determined $200,000 would be required to fund the

airport venture. (R. 1188).
6.

D. Steven Brewster told Dana she needed to come up with $100,000 to

fond half of the airport venture, and he would fond the other $100,000. (R. 1190).
7.

At the time the airport venture was funded, Dana Brewster had access to

$100,000 in fonds through access to her 401k, IRA, and line of credit with Wells Fargo
Bank. (R. 1273-74).
8.

Dana requested a business plan and additional information on the airport

venture before she would come up with the fonds. (R. 1212, ^ 3). Despite Dana's
requests for information from D. Steven Brewster, she was given very little detail and
6

information consisting of two emails, although D. Steven Brewster told Dana Brewster he
had actual sales data from Starbucks Coffee and another coffee chain who were both
prior tenants of the Salt Lake International Airport and did not share that data with Dana.
(R. 1212-13,1TJ4&5).
9.

The airport venture was eventually funded with $100,000 from Roasters

and the remaining $100,000 from D. Steven Brewster individually. (R. 1191). Dana
asserts in her complaint that the entire airport venture should have been owned by
Roasters.
10.

The airport venture has been very profitable and 75% of the money used to

invest in the airport venture was repaid to both D. Steven Brewster and Roasters in the
first year the airport stores were in operation. (R. 1565, p. 29-30).
11.

As it turned out, Roasters would have had enough money through savings

and ongoing earnings, along with earnings from the airport stores to fund the entire
$200,000 for the airport venture instead of only half of that amount. (R. 1228-30; 1565,
pp. 33-34).
12.

Dana initiated this lawsuit against the defendants mainly because D. Steven

Brewster usurped a corporate opportunity by retaining 50% of the airport venture for his
own personal benefit as opposed to allowing Roasters to own the entire 100% of the
opportunity.
13.

Roasters eventually retained the services of R. Brad Townsend, a local

C.P.A. and forensic accountant, to offer a recommendation about whether or not Roasters

7

should pursue the derivative action initiated by Dana Brewster or whether it should move
to dismiss the derivative complaint.
14.

Townsend issued his report on July 7, 2008. That report did not say one

way or the other whether the maintenance ofthe derivative action was in the best interest
ofthe corporation or not. (R. 1565, pp. 36-37). Thereafter, Townsend issued an affidavit
dated October 7, 2008, wherein he makes the conclusory statement: "It is my
recommendation from a financial and accounting perspective that that the derivative
causes of action are dismissed in the best interest of Roasters." (See R. 1026, ^f 10). Mr.
Townsend received no new information from the time he issued his inconclusive report
on July 7, 2008, and when he issued his conclusory affidavit recommending dismissal of
the derivative action on October 7, 2008. (R. 1565, pp. 37-38).
15.

The report of R. Brad Townsend answered a series of questions presented

by Roaster's counsel regarding the financial condition and standing of Roasters,
culminating in the final question of "Is the maintenance ofthe derivative proceeding in
the best interest of Roasters?" Townsend's answer to this inquiry is summarized in the
table below:
QUESTION PRESENTED
1 6. Is the maintenance of
the derivative proceeding
in the best interest of
Roasters? (R. 1289).

MR. TOWNSEND'S RESPONSE

1

"The answer to this question is complex and appears to be more 1
a question of fact than of expert opinion." (R. 1289) (emphasis
added).
"Whether or not the defendant(s) have a fiduciary responsibility
in the various areas alleged by Ms. Brewster is either a question
of fact or law but not an accounting question." (R. 1289-90)
(emphasis added).
|
"Ms. Brewster alleges that Roasters and Mr. Brewster had a
fiduciary obligation to retain the Airport opportunity within

8

Roasters, even if it meant incurring debt that had to be
personally guaranteed. This is not an accounting question but is
a legal question or question of fact that cannot be answered by
a forensic accounting analysis." (R. 1290) (emphasis added)
"Whether or not Mr. Brewster had a fiduciary responsibility to
employ a different structure [incurring debt rather expansion
through equity] is, again, a question of law or fact. (R. 1291)
(emphasis added)
"The cost^benefit relationship [cost of litigation versus potential
recovery] is outside the scope of our expertise." (R. 1291).

16.

Roasters had $197,000 cash on hand at the end of 2007, after contributing

$100,00 to the airport venture and making distributions to owners, revealing that Roasters
could have funded the entire $200,000 investment in the airport venture on its own with
contributions from ongoing revenues from the airport stores. (R. 1229)
17-

At the evidentiary hearing before the Honorable John Paul Kennedy R.

Brad Townsend testified his July 7, 2008 report did not answer the question as to whether
dismissal of the derivative action was in the best interest of the corporation.
Q.

A.
Q.
A.
Q.

A.

It's on page 7. The question that's presented to you is the following:
Is the maintenance of the derivative proceeding in the best interest of
Roasters? Your answer to that is - it goes on for a couple of pages,
but initially your initial paragraph says:
The answer to this question is complex, and appears to be more a
question of fact than of expert opinion.
You don't really even say yes or not in this answer, correct?
Well, you just read one sentence of a two-and-a-half page response
to that question.
Right, but can you show me where you say in that response it is not
in the best interest of the corporation to proceed with the derivative
action?
I don't in this letter, because I was addressing the entire question and we went over this in my deposition. I was addressing the entire
question of whether the derivative action should be retained with
regard to all the legal and factual issues that are also considered in
that point. When I drafted my affidavit, I was asked from a financial

9

QA.

A.

A.
QA.

and accounting standpoint should the derivative action be preserved
by the company.
WellMy opinion between July of 2008 and October of 2008 with regard
to the financial and accounting aspects didn't change.
Okay. That's - we'll have to agree to disagree on that. In your
response to the very direct question on No. 6 as to whether the
maintenance of the derivative proceeding is in the best interest of
Roasters, you don't say yes or no in your report.
I do with regard with financial and accounting issues. I don't say the
derivative action shouldn't be retained, but I say with regard to
financial and accounting issues Right. Well, that's what I'm getting at. You don't say that it should
or should not be retained.
Oh, okay. Well, that's fair. That's fair.
And there was no new information that you analyzed or looked at
between the time you rendered the answer in your report on July 7th
to the time you signed your affidavit on October 7th of 2008.
That's true, yeah.

(R. 1565, pp. 36-38).
18.

The decision on funding the airport venture was made by D. Steven

Brewster, not by the board of directors:

A
Q
A
Q
A
Q
A
Q
A
Q

THE COURT: Now you said that funding through this outside
source that was fairly followed in this case, you thought was a sound
business judgment; is that right - in this instance.
Funding - 1 guess I don't understand the THE COURT: Using t h e Oh, using an outside entity?
THE COURT: Yeah.
Yes.
THE COURT: And that was a sound business judgment; is that
right?
Yes.
THE COURT: Who made that judgment?
Steve Brewster did.
THE COURT: Dana Brewster was not part of making that decision,
or she did not concur in that decision?
I think she had different positions on that particular issue because of
the conflict between the parties. There's some indications that she
10

Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Q.

A.

Q.
A.

thought it would be okay to do it the way they had done other
ventures outside the business entity, but there's also clearly
communications from Ms. Brewster adamantly stating that she
thought the entire project needed to be done in Roasters. Ultimately,
the structure that was employed was employed by Steve Brewster.
THE COURT: So the business judgment was made by a minority
shareholder in the business that you're referring to?
Yes.
THE COURT: It was not a corporate decision?
Well, he is a minority shareholder, but he was the corporate
president, so I'm not which sure hat he had on at the time.
THE COURT: All right. Was it made by the board of directors for
the corporation No.
THE COURT: - or just by him?
Just by him. The reason I view it as a sound business judgment is
that the corporation - the corporation was an equity investor, and so
to the extent that it was done outside of Roasters, that made Mr.
Brewster's money also equity money, so it reduced the risk to the
corporation, because in case of - in a situation where the business
opportunity had not gone well, the - had it been done with debt, the
creditor would have been in line ahead of the corporation. The way
it was structured, it reduced the risk to the corporation on its equity
investment.
THE COURT: But who should make the decision, in your view, as
to whether the risk should be taken? Should that be a corporate
decision or an individual officer's decision or neither? How to you
see that?
Well, I guess maybe we're venturing into the realm of me being a
lawyer, but from my perspective it ought to be a corporate decision,
as a practical matter that the officers make that decision. In kind of
the ideal world, the board of directors would sign off on that, but in
small companies THE COURT: It didn't happen here, did it?
I didn't happen here.

(R. 1565, pp. 51-53)
19.

Mr. Townsend testified he did not see enough information about the airport

opportunity that would make him comfortable in making an investment of $100,000 if he
were in Dana Brewster's shoes.
11

Q.

A.
Q.

A.

I want to shift gears now to talk about the amount of information that
changed hands between Mr. Brewster and Mrs. Brewster - and Dana
Brewster. Was there enough - 1 believe you stated it was your
opinion that if you were the one analyzing whether to make a
decision to invest or not, that there wasn't enough information for
you to make an investment of $100,000, correct?
That's true. With the documents I've seen, I would have - 1 don't
know that I would have been able to make a decision on that.
In fact, I think in your deposition you characterize the quantity of
information changing hands between Mr. Brewster and Dana
Brewster as fairly minimal; is that accurate?
Sure.

(R. 1565, p. 26).

Q.

A.

THE COURT: You said that - as I recall your testimony, that there
wasn't enough information for you to feel comfortable about making
this investment. Is that an accurate statement?
It's accurate to say that if I had to rely solely on the documents that I
had in the case, I would have probably wanted more information
than that to make the investment.

(R. 1565, p. 56).
20.

Mr. Townsend testified he didn't consider the corporation's ability to factor

accounts receivables to fund the airport venture.
Q.
A.

Q.
A.

Q.

THE COURT: What does that - how much could they have funded?
They funded 100,000. They ended up at the end of the year with a
cash reserve of about $42,000. Let me just look here. Well, at the
end of '06 the corporation had $42,000 and change in cash, but it
had $65,000 in short term accounts payable. So I guess - as I sit
here, I would say they probably couldn't have funded any more than
they did.
THE COURT: Even though they had 42,000 cash plus short-term
accounts payable of 65?
Well, the accounts payable were things that were coming due that
they had to pay, so they would have to pay the accounts payable and
payroll and whatnot.
THE COURT: What were their short-term accounts receivable?
12

A.
Q.
A-

The accounts receivable were 123,000. So the THE COURT: Was there an effort made to try to determine whether
that was - you could factor any of that?
I didn't. I didn't look at that.

(R. 1565, p. 57).
21.

Mr. Townsend testified that the corporation only made one superficial

inquiry into obtaining a loan to fund the airport venture.
Q.

A.

Q.
A.
Q.
A.

THE COURT: Did anyone tell you -well, let me - l e t ' s see. Do
you know if the corporation actually investigated the oppor - the
possibility of obtaining financing?
There was an inquiry that Mr. Brewster made with Bank of the
West, and I believe that was the only inquiry with regard to
obtaining outside financing.
THE COURT: No other bank?
Correct.
No other source of financing?
That's right.

(R. 1565, p. 48).
22.

This is the only case where Mr. Townsend has analyzed and offered an

opinion about whether a derivative action should be dismissed or not.
Q.
A.

THE COURT: All right. Only - you say this is the only derivative
case that you've worked on; is that right?
It's the only one where I've been asked to articulate an opinion as to
whether or not to retain the action. I've worked on several
derivative cases.

(R. 1565, p. 53).

13

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Judge Kennedy's inquiry into the recommendation for dismissal of the
derivative action made by R. Brad Townsend to determine if it was made in good faith
and based upon a reasonable inquiry concerning his conclusions and recommendation
was proper, appropriate, and what is required by Utah statutes. See Utah Code Ann. § 1610a-740(4)(a) ("reasonable inquiry upon which its conclusions are based") and Utah
Code Ann. § 16-10a-740(5)(a) ("A derivative proceeding may not be discontinued or
settled without the court's approval").
The trial court must examine whether the decision to dismiss a derivative
proceeding is made in good faith based upon a reasonable inquiry, and if it is not, the trial
court has the duty to deny the request for dismissal. Defendants' assertion that the
language of Utah Code Ann. §16-10a-740(4)(a) requires the trial court to merely rubber
stamp a good faith recommendation for dismissal of a derivative action without any
inquiry about the reasonableness of the conclusion recommending dismissal is erroneous
and not supported by the plain language of the applicable statutes.
Accordingly, Judge Kennedy's decision denying the motion to dismiss the
derivative action was not an abuse of discretion and should be affirmed.

14

ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT IN EXAMINING THE
REASONABLENESS OF THE CONCLUSIONS FROM THE REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF R. BRAD TOWNSEND
While it is true that Dana Brewster stipulated to allow R. Brad Townsend to make

a recommendation as to whether the corporation should dismiss the derivative action or
not, that stipulation did not include a waiver from challenging the reasonableness of the
conclusion or recommendation. Furthermore, it is clear that Defendants misunderstand
the trial court's role in examining the reasonableness of the conclusions made by one
appointed by the Board of Directors. Defendants' argument is essentially that once the
person appointed to make a determination or recommendation about whether a derivative
action should be dismissed or not, the trial court must simply rubber stamp the
recommendation without any inquiry. However, that is simply not accurate.
The controlling statute sets forth standard that the conclusions be reasonable.
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-740 provides as follows:
A derivative proceeding shall be dismissed by the court on motion by the
corporation if a person or group specified in Subsections (4)(b) or (4)(f)
determines in good faith after conducting a reasonable inquiry upon which
its conclusions are based that the maintenance of the derivative proceeding
is not in the best interest of the corporation.

While there is no Utah case law right on point as to the scope and extent of
judicial review of a recommendation to dismiss or allow a derivative action, there are
other states with similar if not identical statutes whose courts have addressed this issue.
For example, Florida's statute reads as follows:
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The court may dismiss a derivative proceeding if, on motion by the
corporation, the court finds that one of the groups specified below has made
a determination in good faith after conducting a reasonable investigation
upon which its conclusion are based that the maintenance of the derivative
suit is not in the best interests of the corporation.
See Fla. Stat. § 607.07401 Shareholders' Derivative Actions. As can be seen, the
language of the Florida statute is remarkably similar to the language of Utah Code Ann. §
16-10a-740(4)(a). In Batur v. Signature Properties of Northwest Florida, Inc., 903 So.2d
985 (Fla. Ct. App. 2005), the Florida Court of Appeals noted, in construing the Florida
statute that the recommendation must still pass judicial review, holding "dismissals of
shareholder derivative actions may, as here, entail can evidentiary hearing with respect to
the disputed issues of bias, conflict of interest, objectivity and reasonableness in the
preparation and presentation of the report." Id. at 995. That is exactly what took place in
front of Judge Kennedy on March 30, 2009.
Further, other jurisdictions plainly hold that the judge has the right and obligation
to inquire into the reasonableness of the recommendation to end a derivative action. See
Weiser v. Grace, 683 N.Y.S.2d 781, 785 (N.Y Sup. Ct. 1998), which provides for the
following standard in analyzing the recommendation concerning the viability of a
derivative action:
If the court concludes that the committee lacked independence, failed to
demonstrate food faith and a reasonable basis for its conclusions or, if the
court is otherwise dissatisfied with the process used by the committee, it
must deny the SLC's motion. However, if the court is satisfied with the
committee's independence, good faith, and the reasonableness of its
decision, the court, in its discretion, may proceed to the second step. In the
second phase, a court must apply its own independent business judgment to
decide whether the motion to dismiss should be granted. The second step is
intended to thwart instances where corporate actions meet the criteria of
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step one, but the result does not appear to satisfy its spirit, or where
corporate actions would simply prematurely terminate a stockholder
grievance deserving of further consideration in the corporation's interest.
Similarly, in Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del 1981), the Delaware
court explained its standard for judicial review of a recommendation concerning a
derivative action as follows:
First, the Court should inquire into the independence and good faith
of the committee and the bases supporting its conclusions. Limited
discovery may be ordered to facilitate such inquiries. The corporation
should have the burden of proving independence, good faith and a
reasonable investigation, rather than presuming independence, good faith
and reasonableness. If the Court determines either that the committee is not
independent or has not shown reasonable bases for its conclusions, or, if the
Court is not satisfied for other reasons relating to the process, including but
not limited to the good faith of the committee, the Court shall deny the
corporation's motion. If, however, the Court is satisfied under Rule 56
standards that the committee was independent and showed reasonable basis
for good faith findings and recommendations, the Court may proceed, in its
discretion, to the next step.
The second step provides, we believe, the essential key in striking
the balance between legitimate corporate claims as expressed in a
derivative stockholder suit and a corporation's best interests as expressed in
a derivative stockholder suit and a corporation's best interests as expressed
by an independent investigating committee. The Court should determine,
applying its own independent business judgment, whether the motion
should be granted. This means, or course, that instances could arise where
a committee can establish its independence and sound bases for its good
faith decisions and still have the corporation's motion denied. The second
step is intended to thwart instances where corporate actions meet the
criteria of step one, but the result does not appear to satisfy its spirit, or
where corporate actions would simply prematurely terminate a stockholder
grievance deserving of further consideration in the corporation's interest.
Id. at 788-89 (emphasis added).
Even if Utah Courts do not engage in the second step of applying its own business
judgment, the trial court must still examine whether there is a reasonable basis for the
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conclusion to terminate or proceed with a derivative action. The result of just that inquiry
may serve as justification for denying the motion to dismiss the derivative action.
A.

Cases relied upon by Defendants.

The cases relied on by Defendant are consistent with the concept that the trial
court has the ability if not the obligation to inquire into the reasonableness of the
conclusions to dismiss a derivative action or not - regardless of whether the court takes
the second step and substitutes its own business judgment. First, in Auerbach v. Bennett,
393 N.E.2d 994, 1002 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1979), the New York court explained "rwlhile the
court may properly inquire as to the adequacy and appropriateness of the committee's
investigative procedures and methodologies, it may not under the guise of consideration
of such factors trespass in the domain of business judgment." Id. (emphasis added).
Also, in In re United Healthcare Group Incorporated Shareholder Derivative
Litigation, 591 F.Supp.2d 1023, 1029 (D. Minn. 2008), the Minnesota Supreme Court
explained what justified the trial court in rejecting a recommendation to dismiss a
derivative action, as follows: "Evidence that 'the investigation has been so restricted in
scope, so shallow in execution, or otherwise so pro forma or halfhearted as to constitute a
pretext or sham . . would raise questions of good faith.'" (citations omitted).
Both of these cases are consistent with the review conducted by Judge Kennedy in
evaluating the scope and depth of the investigation leading up to the recommendation for
dismissal. Neither of these cases stand for the proposition that a trial court should blindly
adopt the recommendation of an independent expert or committee.
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B.

Townsend's report was insufficient basis to sustain a dismissal of the
derivative action.

The main reason and justification for rejecting Mr. Townsend's recommendation that the
derivative action be dismissed is the inadequacy and incomplete nature of Townsend's opinions.
For example, in his report, Townsend answers a series of questions posed by counsel for
Millcreek Coffee Roasters, Corp., leading up to the ultimate question of "Is the maintenance of
the derivative proceeding in the best interest of Roasters?" As can be seen in the table below,
Townsend is unable to answer these questions.
QUESTION PRESENTED MR. TOWNSEND'S RESPONSE

1

6. Is the maintenance of
"The answer to this question is complex and appears to be more a
the derivative proceeding in question of fact than of expert opinion." (R. 1289) (emphasis
the best interest of Roasters? added).
(R. 1289).
"Whether or not the defendant(s) have a fiduciary responsibility 1
in the various areas alleged by Ms. Brewster is either a question
of fact or law but not an accounting question." (R. 1289-90)
(emphasis added).
"Ms. Brewster alleges that Roasters and Mr. Brewster had a
fiduciary obligation to retain the Airport opportunity within
Roasters, even if it meant incurring debt that had to be personally
guaranteed. This is not an accounting question but is a legal
question or question of fact that cannot be answered by a
forensic accounting analysis." (R. 1290) (emphasis added)
"Whether or not Mr. Brewster had a fiduciary responsibility to
employ a different structure [incurring debt rather expansion
through equity] is, again, a question of law or fact. (R. 1291)
(emphasis added)
"The costftenefit relationship [cost of litigation versus potential
recovery] is outside the scope of our expertise." (R. 1291).

Faced with the inadequate responses to the ultimate question about the derivative
action, Judge Kennedy had little choice but to reject the recommendation to terminate the
derivative action because Townsend's report provided no conclusion at all—let alone a
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conclusion that was supported by sound reasoning and analysis. There clearly was not a
sufficient foundation for a recommendation to terminate the derivative action. Townsend
admitted in the evidentiary hearing he doesn't answer the question in his report:
A.
Q.

A.

Q.
A.

My opinion between July of 2008 and October of 2008 with regard
to the financial and accounting aspects didn't change.
Okay. That's - we'll have to agree to disagree on that. In your
response to the very direct question on No. 6 as to whether the
maintenance of the derivative proceeding is in the best interest of
Roasters, you don't say yes or no in your report.
I do with regard with financial and accounting issues. I don't say the
derivative action shouldn't be retained, but I say the derivative
action shouldn't be retained, but I say with regard to financial and
accounting issues Right. Well, that's what I'm getting at. You don't say that it should
or should not be retained.
Oh, okay. Well, that's fair. That's fair.

(R. 1565, p. 37).
The absence of a recommendation in Townsend's report is not cured or
transformed into a well supported recommendation by the fact that after Townsend's
report is issued on July 7, 2008, Townsend issued an affidavit dated October 7, 2008,
wherein he states in conclusory fashion: "It is my recommendation from a financial and
accounting perspective that that the derivative causes of action are dismissed in the best
interest of Roasters." (See R. R. 1026, ^f 10). At the evidentiary hearing before Judge
Kennedy, Townsend admitted he had received no new information from the time he
issues his report and the time he issued his affidavit:
Q.

A.

And there was no new information that you analyzed or looked at
between the time you rendered the answer in your report on July 7th
to the time you signed your affidavit on October 7th of 2008?
That's true, yeah.
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(R. 1565, p. 37-38).
Again, when faced with the inadequate evidence of the report, and the unsupported
and conclusory affidavit from Townsend, Judge Kennedy had no choice but to reject the
poorly founded recommendation to dismiss the derivative action.
C.

The Utah statute allows discovery regarding reasonableness of
procedures employed in making recommendation.

Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-740(3)(e)(C) permits discovery into "the reasonableness
of the procedures following by the person or group." If the trial court is merely supposed
to rubber stamp the recommendation of the independent, good faith committee or
appointed expert, why would discovery be allowed into the "reasonableness of the
procedures following by the person or group" making the recommendation? Moreover,
why would there be a right to interlocutory appeal if the court was required to merely
rubber stamp the recommendation of an independent committee or expert appointed to
make a recommendation? Clearly, the Utah statute contemplates some discovery in order
to permit meaningful judicial review of the recommendation regarding viability of a
derivative action.
D.

The trial court has the statutory duty to approve any dismissal of a
derivative proceeding.

Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-740(5)(a) states "A derivative proceeding may not be
discontinued or settled without the court's approval." This statute is consistent with Utah
Code Ann, § 16-10a-740(4)(a) ("reasonable inquiry upon which its conclusions are
based"), and bolsters Dana Brewster's argument that the trial court has the right and duty
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to examine the reasonableness of the recommendation for dismissal of the derivative
action.
It goes without saying that if the trial court is placed in the position of approving
the settlement or dismissal of a derivative action, the trial court must be able to examine
and inquire into the bases for approving or dismissing the derivative proceeding. In the
case at bar, Judge Kennedy had the right and duty to inquire into the reasons for the
motion to dismiss the derivative proceeding—he is not expected to merely rubber stamp a
recommendation without examining the substance of the recommendation.
II.

RECENT CASELAW FROM THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
ESTABLISHES A HIGHER FIDUCIARY DUTY AMONG
SHAREHOLDERS OF CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS WHICH
PROVIDES FURTHER JUSTIFICATION FOR AFFIRMING JUDGE
KENNEDY'S DECISION BELOW
One of the issues analyzed by R. Brad Townsend concerned the fiduciary duties

owed to other shareholders such as Dana Brewster from Steven Brewster. For example,
in the evidentiary hearing before Judge Kennedy, Townsend testified as follows:
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.

Corporate directors - is it true that corporate directors owe duties of
loyalty to the shareholders?
Well, it's my understanding they do. I mean I'm not a lawyer, but I
- it's my understanding they do.
And full disclosure as well?
That I don't know. I think so, but I don't know.
I think you said in your deposition that you believe that that was the
case.
I believe it is, but I don't Okay.
I don't really have - to me that's a legal opinion whether or not they
owe that, but I believe that's the case.
I want to shift gears now to talk about the amount of information that
changed hands between Mr. Brewster and Mrs. Brewster - and Dana
Brewster. Was there enough - 1 believe you stated it was your
??

A.
Q.
A.

opinion that if you were the one analyzing whether to make a
decision to invest or not, that there wasn't enough information for
you to make an investment of $100,000, correct?
That's true. With the documents I've seen, I would have - 1 don't
know that I would have been able to make a decision on that.
In fact, I think in your deposition you characterize the quantity of
information changing hands between Mr. Brewster and Dana
Brewster as fairly minimal; is that accurate?
Sure.

(R. 1565, p. 5-26).
In McLaughlin v. Schenk, 2009 UT 64, ^f 22, the Utah Supreme Court established a
new standard for fiduciary duties in closely held corporations as follows:
Thus, the Massachusetts approach of recognizing broader fiduciary
duties in closely held corporations better achieves the goals of the Act by
stemming shareholder oppression and is the appropriate standard for
evaluating fiduciary relationship among shareholders in a closely held
corporation. Our adoption of the Massachusetts standard is a logical
extension of our existing unique nature of such corporations and seeks to
protect their shareholders by interpreting the Corporation Act with different
corporate circumstances in mind. By adopting this broader fiduciary
obligation for close corporation shareholders, alternative remedies exist for
oppressed shareholders, such as an equitable claim for dissolution for a
claim for breach of fiduciary duty.
# * #

Breaches of fiduciary duty owed by close corporation shareholders
arise in several circumstances, the facts of which commonly overlap. These
circumstances have been identified as unequal treatment, frustration of
reasonable expectations of involvement, and afreezeoutor squeezeout...
In all cases there is a common element - a shareholder's investment
expectation in a close corporation is frustrated by another shareholder's
actions.
W. at If 24

Thus, the higher fiduciary duties owed to shareholders in a closely held
corporation as announced in McLaughlin v. Schenk, supports Judge Kennedy's decision
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to deny the dismissal of the derivative action, because the duties of loyalty, full
disclosure, and avoidance of self dealing were all at issue below, and would require a
higher standard of duty by Mr. Brewster in handling a corporate opportunity.
CONCLUSION
Judge Kennedy's judicial review of the reasonableness of the recommendation to
dismiss the derivative action was proper, appropriate and required pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 16-10a-740(4)(a) ("reasonable inquiry upon which its conclusions are based") and
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-740(5)(a) ("A derivative proceeding may not be discontinued
or settled without the court's approval"). Mr. Townsend's report also did not provide a
sufficient basis to justify dismissal of the derivative action. Finally, the recent Utah
Supreme Court decision of McLaughlin v. Schenk which adopts higher fiduciary duties
among owners of closely held corporations, provides further support for Judge Kennedy's
denial of the motion to dismiss the derivative action given that the duties of loyalty, self
dealing and full disclosures were wanting in this case.
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